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a b s t r a c t  The aim of this article is to conceptualize autonomy in the 
context of chronic physical illness. To this end, we compare and contrast a 
selection of contemporary philosophical theories of autonomy with social 
scientifi c perspectives on chronic illness, particularly models of disability 
and symbolic interactionism. The philosophical theories mainly depart from 
a positive conceptualization of autonomy, which involves actively shaping 
one’s life and identifying with fundamental values. This conceptualization is 
preferred over a negative conceptualization, which defi nes autonomy as non-
interference, for its compatibility with social models of disability and with the 
assumption that people are interdependent. Interference may disable, but also 
enable people with a chronic illness to shape their lives. What matters is that 
people can realize what they want to realize. We suggest that, in the context of 
chronic physical illness, autonomy might be conceptualized as correspondence 
between what people want their lives to be like and what their lives are actually 
like. Disturbed autonomy might be restored either by expanding opportunities 
to arrange life or by adjusting how one wants life to be arranged. The grounds 
for the latter approach might be questioned, fi rst, if people have not adjusted 
what they want carefully, and second, if reorganization of the material and
social environment would have made it unnecessary to adjust one’s arrange-
ment of life. 
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Introduction
Chronic physical illness may bring about pervasive changes in people’s 
lives. For example, it may become diffi cult to perform valued activities and 
social roles, dependency on others may increase and future plans may need 
adjustment. Under these circumstances, it is a real challenge to preserve 
self-determination. People with a chronic illness continuously have to 
negotiate autonomy in their daily activities and in their relationships with 
family, friends and society (Williams and Wood, 1988).
Previous research has uncovered various threats to autonomy, such as 
functional decline, institutionalization, professionals’ paternalistic ap-
proach, people’s negative mindset and lack of clarity about goals, aspirations 
and purpose in life (Collopy, 1988; Hickey and Stilwell, 1992; Agich, 1993; 
Becker, 1994; McWilliam et al., 1994). Opportunities to promote autonomy 
have been suggested as well, including cognitive behavioral therapy and a 
patient-centered approach by health professionals (Rybarczyk et al., 1992; 
Williams et al., 1998).
The fact that previous research on autonomy has identifi ed different 
threats and opportunities might be due to the use of different conceptual-
izations of autonomy. These may have different implications for research, 
policy and practice aimed at autonomy support. Consider, for example, the 
relationship between autonomy and dependence. As Berlin (1969) already 
has pointed out, some scholars equate autonomy with independence and 
non-interference, which implies that dependence confl icts with autonomy. 
Yet other scholars conceptualize autonomy as actively shaping life in 
accordance with one’s own values (Berlin, 1969). Other people may facil-
itate this, which means that dependence may enable autonomy. Then there 
are scholars who argue that all people depend on others during the entire 
life cycle, albeit to various degrees, which means that autonomy can only 
take shape through this interdependence (Tronto, 1993). Hence, depending 
on its conceptualization, autonomy may be promoted or impinged on by 
reducing dependence.
Which of the different conceptualizations of autonomy is ‘the right one’ 
is an issue unlikely to be resolved, because who should decide this and on 
what grounds (Seidman, 1992)? We might, however, argue on pragmatic 
grounds why we favor a particular conceptualization in a particular con-
text (Seidman, 1992). The implications of different conceptualizations of 
autonomy have been discussed in the contexts of different disciplines such 
as gerontology (Collopy, 1988), nursing (e.g. Hertz, 1996; Ballou, 1998; Proot 
et al., 1998; Keenan, 1999; Aveyard, 2000) and rehabilitation (Proot et al., 
1998). In the context of chronic physical illness, however, the implications 
of different conceptualizations have not been discussed yet. It therefore 
remains unclear how autonomy might be understood with regard to chronic 
physical illness.
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This article aims to conceptualize autonomy in the context of chronic 
physical illness. To this end, we compare and contrast a selection of con-
temporary philosophical theories of autonomy with social scientifi c per-
spectives on chronic illness. The philosophical theories offer a thorough 
debate on autonomy, while the social scientifi c perspectives provide a rich 
source of insights into living with chronic illness. Some of these philo-
sophical theories adopt a view of human beings that has been criticized 
for its focus on reason and consciousness and its disregard of the social 
reality people are embedded in (Hall, 1992; Tronto, 1993; Mackenzie and 
Stoljar, 2000a). Although this criticism is deserved, we think the conceptual 
clarity of these theories may still help to conceptualize autonomy in the 
context of chronic physical illness, particularly in combination with the 
other theories that will be discussed.
First, we discuss the difference between negative and positive autonomy, 
an important classifi cation of contemporary philosophical theories of 
autonomy. Next, we discuss four philosophical theories of autonomy in 
greater depth. The fi rst theory (Feinberg, 1986) discusses prerequisites for 
autonomy, while the three other theories (Dworkin, 1988, 1989; Frankfurt, 
1989; Agich, 1993; Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000a) focus primarily on the con-
ceptualization of autonomy. The second (Dworkin, 1988, 1989; Frankfurt, 
1989) has an individualistic, psychological focus, while the third (Agich, 
1993) and fourth (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000a) put more emphasis on 
social conditions and practical circumstances. We relate each theory to 
social scientifi c perspectives on living with chronic illness, particularly social 
models of disability and symbolic interactionism. Furthermore, we relate 
each theory to the case of Anne, which is described in the next section. 
Finally, we suggest how autonomy might be conceptualized in the context 
of chronic physical illness and we briefl y discuss some additional critical 
views on this concept of autonomy.
The case of Anne
Anne is a middle-aged woman who is married and has two sons away at 
college. Anne worked as a head nurse at the local hospital, when she was 
diagnosed with emphysema a few years ago. Emphysema is a lung disease 
that is characterized by shortness of breath and that gets worse gradually. 
At fi rst, Anne continued her job full time with the support of her colleagues, 
but then she got to the point where she was so tired when she got home 
from work that all she could do was eat and go to bed. Her husband and 
sons took a larger share in housekeeping, but eventually, Anne decided to 
work shorter hours. It was tough on her, because she had to give up her post 
as a head nurse. Last year, Anne’s company doctor told her that she had 
to quit her job entirely. Anne felt pushed out and had diffi culty reconcil-
ing to disability. She therefore volunteered as a counselor for people with 
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a terminal illness because she expected that, as a counselor, she could truly 
be there for patients, which she often had felt she could not when she was 
head nurse. Today, the positive feedback from patients and colleagues gives 
Anne much satisfaction and she enjoys counseling.
How might autonomy be understood in Anne’s case? Is it impinged on, 
because she fi rst lost her position as head nurse and then her entire job? 
Or is this a prime illustration of autonomy, because Anne makes her own 
decisions, takes initiative and fi nds a solution?
Negative and positive autonomy
An important classifi cation of contemporary philosophical theories of 
autonomy is the distinction between negative and positive autonomy, 
which was fi rst made by Berlin (1969). While negative autonomy refers to 
non-interference, positive autonomy refers to actively shaping one’s life 
and identifying with fundamental values. It is about being in charge of life 
(Berlin, 1969).
In negative conceptualizations of autonomy, a person is autonomous 
if no one interferes with his/her actions. In the context of chronic illness, 
concerned family members who prevent certain activities or, in the case 
of institutionalization restrictive regulations, may impinge on negative 
autonomy. In the case of Anne, negative autonomy is not impinged on by 
working shorter hours, because no one interfered to make this happen. It is 
however impinged on by the eventual job loss, because the company doctor 
ordered this.
Since negative autonomy may be promoted by minimizing interference, 
it is compatible with medical models of disability, which present disability 
as an individual attribute, which is caused by disease and may be solved 
by medical intervention (Barnes et al., 1999). Furthermore, it is in line 
with a particular version of social models of disability, the minority group 
approach. This approach considers people with disabilities as a minority 
group whose civil rights must be protected by anti-discrimination legis-
lation. Discrimination is an impingement on negative autonomy, because 
people are hindered in their actions by others (Bickenbach et al., 1999).
Generally speaking though, negative autonomy is not compatible with 
social models of disability because these models argue that interference 
may be enabling as well as disabling. In particular, social models contend 
that restrictions and opportunities exist side by side, because the material 
and social organization of the environment varies in the degree in which the 
needs of people with a chronic illness are taken into account (Bickenbach 
et al., 1999). Hence, a social model might for example reason that when 
Anne lost her position as head nurse her autonomy could have been pre-
served if her employer had assigned another head nurse to share the position 
with Anne part time.
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In positive conceptualizations of autonomy, a person is autonomous 
if she actively shapes her life and identifi es with fundamental values. In 
Anne’s case, positive autonomy is impinged on because Anne does not 
succeed in holding down her job although she wants to work. Positive 
autonomy is compatible with social and socio-medical models of disability. 
The latter relate restrictions in activities and social participation to an 
interaction between person, disease and environment (e.g. Verbrugge and 
Jette, 1994; WHO, 2001). Hence, in this view, Anne loses her job because 
she has emphysema and both she and her employer do not adapt to this 
circumstance adequately.
Positive autonomy may be promoted by increasing people’s opportu-
nities to arrange their lives. As mentioned earlier, the minority group ver-
sion of the social model wants to create equal opportunities by means of 
anti-discrimination legislation. Another version of the social model calls 
for universalizing disability policy: rather than focusing on special needs, 
policy should acknowledge the wide variation between people and commit 
to ‘universal design, not merely for public buildings and transportation, but 
across the board for housing, workplaces and other human environments’ 
(Bickenbach et al., 1999: 1183).
As mentioned briefl y in the introduction, the difference between nega-
tive and positive autonomy is also relevant to the relationship between 
autonomy and dependence. Gignac and Cott (1998) distinguish four types 
of dependence/independence: dependence (needs and receives assistance); 
imposed dependence (does not need, but receives assistance); independence 
(does not need and does not receive assistance); and non-independence 
(needs, but does not receive assistance). As mentioned earlier, we might also 
think of people as interdependent, that is, dependent on each other, rather 
than distinguishing between dependence and independence (Tronto, 1993). 
Anne’s case has elements of dependence (her colleagues and family provided 
assistance that Anne needed), independence (Anne does not need and does 
not receive assistance to do her volunteer work), non-independence (Anne 
did not receive the assistance she needed to keep her paid job in general 
and her position as head nurse in particular) and interdependence (Anne’s 
family, patients and colleagues depend on her support, care, instructions 
and so on).
In negative conceptualizations, dependence, imposed dependence and 
interdependence are impingements on autonomy (interference), while 
independence and non-independence are not (non-interference). Put dif-
ferently, in negative conceptualizations of autonomy, it matters whether 
people receive assistance and not whether they need it. If people do not 
receive the assistance they need, the environment may not be enabling, but 
what matters here is that it is not interfering either.
In positive conceptualizations, independence, dependence and inter-
dependence are compatible with autonomy, while non-independence is 
not. Imposed dependency is compatible if it is self-imposed. Baltes (1996) 
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has called this self-regulated dependence: people accept dependence in 
certain domains in order to have enough energy for other domains that they 
value more. In other words, in positive conceptualizations of autonomy, it 
matters whether people get what they need.
In summary, chronic illness may impinge on both negative and positive 
autonomy, but the circumstances under which this occurs differ. Nega-
tive autonomy is impinged on if someone receives assistance (regardless 
of whether or not she needs it), while positive autonomy is impinged on if 
someone does not receive the assistance she needs. Generally, we would 
argue for a positive conceptualization of autonomy in the context of chronic 
physical illness, because it takes account of people’s actual needs and is 
compatible with social models of disability and with the assumption that 
people are interdependent. Despite this compatibility, not all positive 
philosophical theories of autonomy actually discuss autonomy in a social 
context, as the discussion of split-level theory below will show. First, we 
turn to Feinberg (1986), who has presented a model of prerequisites for 
autonomy, which includes both positive and negative elements.
Prerequisites for autonomy
According to Feinberg (1986), people are autonomous if they display a 
certain blend of virtues, including authenticity, identifi cation, initiative 
and responsibility for self. This condition of autonomy depends on three 
necessary – but not suffi cient – prerequisites. First, people need the cap-
acity to govern themselves, which is determined by the ability to make 
rational choices. Second, people need the right to be a sovereign authority. 
In order to acquire this right, the capacity to govern oneself should be 
above a certain threshold. Third, people need opportunities, which depend 
on luck according to Feinberg.
It seems that all three prerequisites for autonomy might be affected 
by chronic illness. First, diseases like Alzheimer’s disease or stroke might 
affect one’s capacity. In these cases, someone may not only experience diffi -
culty in refl ecting on what they want, but also in making their wishes known 
to others (impingement on positive autonomy). Pain or fatigue may also 
infl uence decision making. Second, the right to be a sovereign authority 
is at stake if people’s legal capacity is questioned or if people have to sub-
mit to restrictive regulations in institutions (impingement on negative 
autonomy). Third, if we extend Feinberg’s theory using models of disability, 
opportunities may be restricted as a result of disease and/or the material 
and social organization of the environment, which may not adequately take 
into account the needs of people with a chronic illness (impingement on 
positive autonomy).
In our example, Anne has both the capacity and the right to be a sover-
eign authority, but there is a lack of opportunity to hold down her job. This 
may be explained differently, depending on the model of disability used. 
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From a medical point of view, Anne might not be fi t enough physically to 
hold down her job. Social models might focus on the efforts of Anne’s em-
ployer to meet her special needs. A socio-medical model might consider 
not only medical and social, but also personal factors like activity accom-
modation and coping.
Feinberg’s model does not reveal clearly in which circumstances Anne 
might actually be considered autonomous, because Feinberg does not spe-
cify the exact composition of characteristics that make up the condition 
of autonomy. Might Anne be considered autonomous because she takes 
initiative and responsibility for herself, fi rst by reducing her working hours 
and then by volunteering as a counselor? Or might she not be considered 
autonomous because she does not identify with disability? The theories 
in the following three sections present positive conceptualizations of the 
condition of autonomy.
Split-level theory
Split-level theory consists of a theory of the person developed by Frankfurt 
(1989) and a theory of autonomy developed by Dworkin (1988, 1989).
Frankfurt (1989) bases his theory on the capacity of persons to refl ect 
on what they want to be motivated by. This capacity leads to a hierarchical 
order of desires. First-order desires express what a person wants. A person 
can have multiple desires, which may possibly, but not necessarily con-
fl ict. Not all desires result in action. If a fi rst-order desire leads to action, 
it is called an effective desire. For example, a person with congestive heart 
failure may have both the desire to take the bus to work as usual, and to 
travel to work by bicycle, as advised by her doctor to get regular exercise. 
If the person takes the bus, this is the effective desire. Second-order desires 
express what a person wants to want, that is, what she wants to be motiv-
ated by. They are formed through rational, refl ective self-evaluation. The 
person in the example might decide that she wants to be motivated by 
the desire to travel by bike, lifting this desire to the second order.
Dworkin (1988, 1989) adds to this, stating that second-order desires 
do not have to be unique or attained uninfl uenced, but they must undergo 
critical scrutiny in order to become one’s own. The desires that people have 
are theirs, but not automatically their own. For example, health promotion 
programs may make people feel that they should exercise regularly, adhere 
to a balanced diet or quit smoking, but in order to make these kinds of life-
style modifi cations second-order desires, people have to ask themselves 
whether these modifi cations are something that they really want them-
selves. It is crucial to autonomy that people possess ‘the capacity to raise 
the question of whether I will identify with or reject the reasons for which 
I now act’ (Dworkin, 1988: 15). This evaluation must occur free from sub-
verting infl uences, such as manipulation or coercive persuasion. Spouses 
who keep on about regular exercise, and authoritarian medical professionals 
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who tell people to modify their lifestyle, present obstacles to an evaluation 
made in freedom.
Dworkin further argues that autonomy is not a mere refl ective notion, 
but also includes the attempt to make the outcome of evaluation effective. 
This means that people should try to act for the reasons for which they 
want to act (e.g. try to travel to work by bike). Dworkin emphasizes that it 
is the attempt that matters, not whether people actually succeed in acting 
for the reasons for which they want to act. One of Dworkin’s arguments is 
that people might otherwise realize autonomy via intuitively wrong ways. 
In particular, Dworkin feels that there is something wrong with scaling 
down second-order desires in order to become autonomous.
The issue is particularly relevant in the context of chronic illness because 
scaling down is exactly what may happen in response to chronic illness. 
Charmaz (1995) describes how people move up and down an identity hier-
archy in response to the course of illness and their social situations. An 
identity hierarchy consists of identity goals, which represent what or who 
a person wants to be, strives or hopes for, either explicitly or implicitly. 
Moving up and down the hierarchy, people weigh different identities 
against each other and determine which to give up in order to retain others 
(identity trade-offs). Generally, deterioration in physical functioning will 
force people to scale down their identity goals, while an improvement in 
physical functioning will encourage people to scale up their identity goals. 
Some people are hesitant to scale down identity goals, because they 
underestimate their decline, fi nd the resulting identity losses too great or 
have strong feelings of commitment and responsibility. Other people are 
hesitant to scale up identity goals, because they fear failure or relapse 
(Charmaz, 1995).
According to Dworkin, people who scale down identity goals are not 
autonomous. On closer reading, however, Dworkin seems to be particularly 
concerned that people might scale down second-order desires too easily 
in order to realize autonomy. Dworkin would have diffi culty accepting 
that a person who has decided she wants to travel to work by bike realizes 
autonomy by taking the bus at the fi rst sight of rain and then deciding that 
traveling by bike is not what she wants after all. However, Dworkin would 
probably agree that scaling down second-order desires might produce 
autonomy after critical self-evaluation, as is the case in identity trade-offs. 
For example, a person may discover that she could really use a shower when 
she travels to work by bike, but that there are no facilities. After carefully 
considering whether she really wants to travel to work by bike under these 
circumstances, she might decide that she would rather travel by bus.
Applying Dworkin’s argumentation to the case of Anne, what Anne 
does is not really all that relevant in the end, as long as she does it after 
careful consideration. Whether she would have volunteered as counselor 
or protested against the loss of her job or decided that she wanted to spend 
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her limited energy on, say, social activities, she is considered autonomous 
if she identifi es with the reasons for her actions.
Actual autonomy
In contrast to Feinberg (1986) and Dworkin (1988, 1989), Agich (1993) ap-
proaches autonomy as embedded in the practical, social world of everyday 
life. Rather than making autonomy an abstract ideal, Agich focuses on 
actual autonomy. He is critical of the idea proposed by split-level theory, 
that second-order desires are formed through refl ective self-evaluation. 
According to Agich, higher-order principles (i.e. Dworkin’s second-order 
desires) are not a top–down affair, as claimed by split-level theory, but the 
product of a two-way process. Higher-level principles are constructed from 
actual experiences and choices; they guide future actions. These actions 
in turn infl uence the higher-level principles. Rather than an end-state, auton-
omy should be conceived as an ongoing process: ‘To be an autonomous 
person in the world is to develop … as an integrative process of accommod-
ating oneself to new circumstances and adapting those circumstances to 
one’s unique structures of meaning’ (Agich, 1993: 106).
Certainly, Agich does not deny that people might refl ect on who they are 
or what guides them. In particular, existential crises, life transitions or sick-
ness may bring people to consciously consider such matters. But this is not 
how autonomy is displayed in daily life. In daily life, people display auton-
omy through constant adjustment of their intentions to the opportunities 
and limitations encountered in their interaction with the world. A sense of 
self can be derived from people’s actual choices, motivations and experi-
ences, which can be expressed in terms of higher-level principles. These 
principles guide future action and are subject to change. Agich’s point is that 
these principles are the product of real life, rather than critical refl ection. 
Autonomy is an ongoing process in which people develop, express and 
confi rm their identity in interaction with the world around them.
Agich’s presentation of autonomy including accommodation and iden-
tity development shows close parallels to symbolic interactionist work on 
biographies (Bury, 1982; Corbin and Strauss, 1988). According to this work, 
people experience a biographical disruption when they are confronted with 
chronic illness, meaning that they can no longer rely on assumptions and 
behaviors that they formerly took for granted (Bury, 1982). Restoring a bio-
graphy requires the fulfi llment of four tasks, which occur simultaneously 
and interact with each other. People have to integrate the course of illness 
into their biography, they must reach a certain degree of understanding 
and acceptance of the consequences of illness, they must reconstruct their 
identity, and fi nally, they must give their biography a new direction (Corbin 
and Strauss, 1988: 68).
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Both the symbolic interactionists and Agich assume an ongoing pro-
cess, in which events and experiences in daily life may disturb people and 
their identities, but may then be integrated and guide future actions. In this 
view, then, changing higher-order principles is a valid and natural way to 
establish correspondence between higher-order principles and actions. In 
fact, from Agich’s point of view, it is a necessary course to restore autonomy, 
since Agich considers accommodating to circumstances as necessary for the 
process of autonomy.
In Anne’s case, autonomy would thus involve an adjustment of her inten-
tions to disability. Anne would have to reconstruct her identity, incorporating 
disability. She actually does this by volunteering for work as a counselor, 
which enables her to continue to work with patients despite disability.
Relational autonomy
The developmental nature of autonomy and its embeddedness in the social 
world, which Agich (1993) stresses, have also been addressed by feminist 
scholars (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000a). They criticize the inherent indi-
vidualism and rationalism of prevailing conceptualizations of autonomy. 
In contrast, they conceptualize autonomy relationally, aiming to express that 
people are not only rational, but emotional and creative as well, and that 
they are embedded and socialized in a social and historical context in which 
they depend on each other. Through social relationships and in networks, 
people constitute their identity and fi nd recognition of it. Only through the 
social context, can autonomy take shape (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000b).
Unlike Agich (1993) and like split-level theory (Dworkin, 1988, 1989; 
Frankfurt, 1989), the relational scholars attribute a central place to conscious 
refl ection in the realization of autonomy. However, unlike split-level theory 
and like symbolic interactionism (Corbin and Strauss, 1988; Frank, 1995), 
they contend that refl ection does not necessarily have to be rational, but 
may also involve emotions, creativity or imagination (Friedman, 2000; 
Mackenzie, 2000). Symbolic interactionism too describes how people make 
sense of and give meaning to their lives by daydreaming, imagining and 
constructing stories (Corbin and Strauss, 1988; Frank, 1995). According to 
the relational scholars, refl ection is not primarily an individual matter, but a 
process that takes place through interaction and communication. Autonomy 
thus is based upon dialogical hermeneutic procedures. This entails a view of 
autonomy as self-development through dialogue (Widdershoven, 1999).
In the case of Anne, relational autonomy is illustrated by the support 
of family and colleagues who help Anne, fi rst, to continue her job and then 
to make a tough decision and give up her position as head nurse to reduce 
work hours. Relational autonomy is impinged on when Anne hears that 
she will lose her job and feels pushed out. The company doctor does not 
take into account Anne’s circumstances and does not offer any support. 
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Relational autonomy requires that Anne can take account of her feelings 
in this diffi cult situation and get support from others to fi nd a solution that 
fi ts her needs. One might question whether the situation could not have been 
changed in such a way that Anne would have been able to continue working 
at the hospital. After this phase, Anne is able to fi nd a new way of living, in 
interaction with others. The position as a counselor seems an opportunity 
for Anne to develop herself, and the positive feedback from colleagues and 
patients seems to reinforce her satisfaction with the position.
Discussion
We have presented a selection of philosophical theories of autonomy in 
relation to the context of chronic physical illness as described by social 
scientifi c perspectives. The emphasis was on positive autonomy, although 
chronic illness might also impinge on negative autonomy. However, a 
negative conceptualization of autonomy seems unsatisfactory in the context 
of chronic illness because it focuses on impingements on autonomy due 
to interference from the environment. In contrast, a positive approach is 
compatible with interference provided it meets people’s needs, although 
not all positive theories of autonomy take account of the social and practical 
context of daily life in which people depend on each other, as split-level 
theory illustrates.
Dworkin (1988, 1989), Agich (1993) and the relational scholars 
(Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000a) all present positive conceptualizations of 
autonomy, but Dworkin focuses on an individual, psychological process, 
while Agich and the relational scholars focus on accommodation to the 
social, practical world of daily life. According to Dworkin, critical refl ection 
on desires is the key to autonomy. Hence, as long as chronic illness does not 
affect the capacity to refl ect, it does not threaten autonomy. Agich argues, 
that chronic illness may change someone’s daily reality in such a way that 
she can no longer identify with it. Autonomy then requires accommodation 
to the changed circumstances.
When accommodation is diffi cult, Agich suggests that the circumstances 
might need to be changed to facilitate identity development. Likewise, social 
and socio-medical models of disability point out, that a restrictive material 
and social organization of the environment may restrict opportunities. 
Hence, reorganization of the environment might increase opportunities and 
make accommodation superfl uous.
If this is so, then Dworkin is right to express his concern that people 
might scale down second-order desires too easily. Not because people might 
scale down desires without careful consideration, but rather because people 
might accommodate to opportunity ranges that are unnecessarily restrict-
ive. In the case of Anne, allowing part-timers to share the position of head 
nurse might have enabled Anne to keep her position as head nurse while 
she worked at the hospital.
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The importance of opportunities is recognized by Feinberg (1986), who 
presents opportunities as a necessary prerequisite of autonomy. Feinberg’s 
model offers conceptual clarity, putting the condition of autonomy at the 
center, with capacity, right and opportunities as prerequisites. However, it 
also has three important shortcomings. First, it ignores the social context 
people are embedded in, because it presents opportunities simply as the 
result of bad luck. As already indicated above, this might be ‘fi xed’ in the 
context of physical chronic illness by extending Feinberg’s model with a 
model of disability. We would suggest a socio-medical model, because it 
considers the interplay between person, disease and environment instead 
of focusing on one aspect. Second, Feinberg’s model narrows the capacity 
to direct one’s life down to the ability to make rational choices, which fem-
inist scholars, among others, have long agitated against (Mackenzie and 
Stoljar, 2000a). And third, it does not specify the exact composition of char-
acteristics that make up the condition of autonomy.
The second and third shortcoming of Feinberg’s model might be fi xed 
by combining it with the theories of the condition of autonomy (split-level 
theory, actual autonomy and relational autonomy). In all these three theories, 
achieving correspondence between higher-order principles and actions 
appears to be the ‘ultimate goal’ of autonomy. However, split-level theory 
still has in common with Feinberg’s model an ignorance of the social context 
and a focus on rational refl ection. Also, its conceptualization of autonomy 
implies that autonomy requires that people know their desires. Yet this 
assumption has been criticized from different perspectives. Psychoanalysts, 
for instance, argue that persons do not know all their desires, because un-
conscious psychological processes may be at work. Marxist structuralist 
scholars argue that persons can never truly know what they want, because 
they are always shaped by circumstances formed by former generations. 
And poststructuralist scholars, for example, add to this that the meaning of 
an identity can never be completely fi xed, as meanings in general never are, 
because they are expressed in language, which is a social system in which 
meanings arise and vary in relation to others (Hall, 1992).
These points of critique have led scholars to reject the idea of autonom-
ous persons altogether. Alternatively, the relational scholars and Agich 
present conceptualizations of autonomy that meet those critiques to some 
extent. Relational and actual autonomy can only take shape through the 
social, historical environment. Furthermore, the relational scholars broaden 
the capacity to direct one’s life from rational refl ection to involve emotions, 
creativity and dialogue as well, while Agich argues that conscious refl ection 
is possible but not the usual way in which principles are developed and 
modifi ed. Higher-order principles are rather the product of choices and ex-
periences in real life.
We therefore suggest conceptualizing autonomy in the context of phy-
sical chronic illness as correspondence between what people want their 
345
Mars et al.: Conceptualizing Autonomy in Chronic Physical Illness
lives to be like and what their lives are actually like. To achieve this cor-
respondence, people need to develop principles expressing what they want 
their lives to be like. Furthermore, they need the opportunities to arrange 
their lives. People generally develop these principles in daily life, as they 
interact, make choices and gather experiences. Refl ection – involving ratio, 
emotions, creativity, imagination or dialogue – can, however, also play a 
role in the process of developing and modifying principles. If chronic illness 
has disturbed the correspondence between what people want their lives 
to be like and what their lives are actually like, the correspondence may 
be restored either by increasing the opportunities to arrange life or by 
adjusting how one wants life to be arranged. The grounds for the second 
approach might be questioned, fi rst, if people have not carefully changed 
what they want, and second, if reorganization of the material and social 
environment would have made it unnecessary to adjust principles about the 
arrangement of life.
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